We may suppose that the natural kinds in the mature sciences usually match kinds of things found in nature, but even Putnam rejects such optimism in immature science. What indeed are the objects of immature science, when we later find that the objects once proposed “do not exist”? Two philosophical tendencies have appeared. There is straw realism, which holds that natural kind terms either pick out essential properties or else refer to nothing (almost “mean nothing”). Then there is a straw idealism-cum-nominalism holding that all natural kind terms are features of our “conceptual scheme,” human artifacts that float freely on the surface of the world. Not enough good sense has yet been inserted between these straw extremes, and I find Foucault’s archaeology points in directions that we would do well to explore.

In scholastic times, “realism” contrasted with nominalism, while Kant made it contrast with Berkeley’s idealism. In either sense we must be, to abuse Kant’s words, empirical realists. There is of course a rich plethora of things around us, really existing anterior to any thought. Moreover, we cannot help but sort many things as we do: we are, it seems, made to sort things much as we do. Not only translation and mutual understanding but also our sheer existence seem to depend upon this fact. But something else happens when we engage in reflective discourse. One of Foucault’s projects is to understand how “objects constitute themselves in discourse.” All our experience with immature science suggests that any chosen body of thought will define for us only some sorts of “objects” entering into only some sorts of “laws,” falling under only some kinds of “kinds.” About these we cannot fail to be “nominalists,” but the “ism” is not what matters. Since most, if not all, knowledge is “immature” in this way, attempting to understand how objects constitute themselves in discourse must be a central topic, not exactly of the theory of knowledge, but of what I would now call historical ontology.

Were there any perverts before the late nineteenth century? According to Arnold Davidson, “The answer is no... Perversion was not a disease that lurked about in nature, waiting for a psychiatrist with especially acute powers of observation to discover it hiding everywhere. It was a disease created by a new (functional) understanding of disease” (Davidson 2001, 24). Davidson is not denying that there have been odd people at all times.
He is asserting that perversion, as a disease, and the pervert, as a diseased person, were created in the late nineteenth century. Davidson's claim, one of many now in circulation, illustrates what I call making up people.

I have three aims: I want a better understanding of claims as curious as Davidson's; I would like to know if there could be a general theory of making up people, or whether each example is so peculiar that it demands its own nongeneralizable story; and I want to know how this idea of "making up people" affects our very idea of what it is to be an individual. I should warn that my concern is philosophical and abstract; I look more at what people might be than at what we are. I imagine a philosophical notion I call dynamic nominalism, and reflect too little on the ordinary dynamics of human interaction.

First we need more examples. I study the dullest of subjects, the official statistics of the nineteenth century. They range, of course, over agriculture, education, trade, births, and military might, but there is one especially striking feature of the avalanche of numbers that begins around 1820. It is obsessed with analyse morale, namely, the statistics of deviance. It is the numerical analysis of suicide, prostitution, drunkenness, vagrancy, madness, crime, les misérables. Counting generated its own subdivisions and re-arrangements. We find classifications of over 4,000 different crisscrossing motives for murder and requests that the police classify each individual suicide in twenty-one different ways. I do not believe that motives of these sorts or suicides of these kinds existed until the practice of counting them came into being (Hacking 1982a).

New slots were created in which to fit and enumerate people. Even national and provincial censuses amazingly show that the categories into which people fall change every ten years. Social change creates new categories of people, but the counting is no mere report of developments. It elaborately, often philanthropically, creates new ways for people to be.

People spontaneously come to fit their categories. When factory inspectors in England and Wales went to the mills, they found various kinds of people there, loosely sorted according to tasks and wages. But when they had finished their reports, millhands had precise ways in which to work, and the owner had a clear set of concepts about how to employ workers according to the ways in which he was obliged to classify them.

I am more familiar with the creation of kinds among the masses than with interventions that act upon individuals, though I did look into one rare kind of insanity. I claim that multiple personality as an idea and as a clinical phenomenon was invented around 1875: only one or two possible cases per generation had been recorded before that time, but a whole flock of them came after. I also found that the clinical history of split personality parodies itself—the one clear case of classic symptoms was long recorded as two, quite distinct, human beings, each of which was multiple. There was "the lady of MacNish," so called after a report in The Philosophy of Sleep, written by the Edinburgh physician Robert MacNish in 1832, and there was one Mary R. The two would be reported in successive paragraphs as two different cases, although in fact Mary Reynolds was the very split-personality lady reported by MacNish (Hacking 1986).

Mary Reynolds died long before 1875, but she was not taken up as a case of multiple personality until then. Not she but one Félida X got the split-personality industry under way. As the great French psychiatrist Pierre Janet remarked at Harvard in 1906, Félida's history "was the great argument of which the positivist psychologists made use at the time of the heroic struggles against the dogmatism of Cousin's school. But for Félida, it is not certain that there would be a professorship of psychology at the Collège de France" (Janet 1907, 78). Janet held precisely that chair. The "heroic struggles" were important for our passing conceptions of the self, and for individuality, because the split Félida was held to refute the dogmatic transcendental unity of apperception that made the self prior to all knowledge.

After Félida came a rush of multiples. The syndrome bloomed in France and later flourished in America, which is still its home. Do I mean that there were no multiples before Félida? Yes. Except for a very few earlier examples, which after 1875 were reinterpreted as classic multiples, there was no such syndrome for a disturbed person to display or to adopt.

I do not deny that there are other behaviors in other cultures that resemble multiple personality. Possession is our most familiar example—a common form of Renaissance behavior that died long ago, though it was curiously hardy in isolated German villages even late in the nineteenth century. Possession was not split personality, but if you balk at my implication that a few people (in committee with their medical or moral advisers) almost choose to become splits, recall that tormented souls in the past have often been said to have in some way chosen to be possessed, to have been seeking attention, exorcism, and tranquility.

I should give one all-too-tidy example of how a new person can be made up. Once again I quote from Janet, whom I find the most open and honor-
able of the psychiatrists. He is speaking to Lucie, who had the once-fashionable but now-forgotten habit of automatic writing. Lucie replies to Janet in writing without her normal self’s awareness:

Janet. Do you understand me?
Lucie (writes). No.
J. But to reply you must understand me!
L. Oh yes, absolutely.
J. Then what are you doing?
L. Don’t know.
J. It is certain that someone is understanding me.
L. Yes.
J. Who is that?
L. Somebody besides Lucie.
J. Aha! Another person. Would you like to give her a name?
L. No.
J. Yes. It would be far easier that way.
L. Oh well. If you want: Adrienne.
J. Then, Adrienne, do you understand me?
L. Yes. (Janet 1886, 581)

If you think this is what people used to do in the bad old days, consider poor Charles (or Eric, or Mark—a multiple), who was featured on a whole page of Time magazine on October 25, 1982 (p. 70). He was picked up wandering aimlessly and was placed in the care of Dr. Malcolm Graham of Daytona Beach, who in turn consulted with Dr. William Rothstein, a notable student of multiple personality at the University Hospital in Columbia, South Carolina. Here is what is said to have happened:

After listening to a tape recording made in June of the character Mark, Graham became convinced he was dealing with a multiple personality. Graham began consulting with Rothstein, who recommended hypnosis. Under the spell, Eric began calling his characters. Most of the personalities have been purged, although there are three or four being treated, officials say. It was the real personality that signed a consent form that allowed Graham to comment on the case. (The State, Columbia, S.C., 4 October 1982, p. 3A.)

Hypnosis elicited Charles, Eric, Mark, and some 24 other personalities. When I read of such present-day manipulations of character, I pine a little

for Mollie Fancher, who gloried in the personalities of Sunbeam, Idol, Rosebud, Pearl, and Ruby. She became somewhat split after being dragged a mile by a horse car. She was not regarded as especially deranged, nor in much need of “cure.” She was much loved by her friends, who memorialized her in 1894 in a book with the title Mollie Fancher, The Brooklyn Enigma: An Authentic Statement of Facts in the Life of Mollie J. Fancher, The Psychological Marvel of the Nineteenth Century (Dailey 1894). The idea of making up people has, I said, become quite widespread. The Making of the Modern Homosexual (Plummer 1981) is a good example; “Making” in this title is close to my “making up.” The contributors by and large accept that

the homosexual and the heterosexual as kinds of persons (as ways to be persons, or as conditions of personhood) came into being only toward the end of the nineteenth century. There has been plenty of same-sex activity in all ages, but not, it is argued, same-sex people and different-sex people. I do not wish to enter the complexities of that idea, but will quote a typical passage from this anthology to show what is intended: “One difficulty in transcending the theme of gender inversion as the basis of the specialized homosexual identity was the rather late historical development of more precise conceptions of components of sexual identity” (Marshall 1981, 150). And in a footnote to this passage: “It is not suggested that these components are ‘real’ entities, which awaited scientific ‘discovery.’ However once the distinctions were made, new realities effectively came into being” (249, n. 6).

Note how the language here resembles my opening quotation: “not a disease . . . in nature, waiting for . . . observation to discover it” versus “not . . . ‘real’ entities, which awaited scientific ‘discovery.’” Moreover, this author too suggests that “once the distinctions were made, new realities effectively came into being.”

This theme, the emergence of the homosexual as a kind of person, is often traced to a paper by Mary MacIntosh, “The Homosexual Role,” which she published in 1968 in Social Problems (MacIntosh 1968). That journal was much devoted to “labeling theory,” which asserts that social reality is conditioned, stabilized, or even created by the labels we apply to people, actions, and communities. Already in 1963, “A Note on the Uses of Official Statistics” in the same journal anticipated my own inferences about counting and kinds of people (Kituse and Cewel 1963). But there is a currently more fashionable source of the idea of making up people, namely, Michel Foucault, to whom both Arnold Davidson and I are indebted. A quotation
from Foucault provides the epigraph—following one from Nietzsche—for The Making of the Modern Homosexual; and although its authors cite some 450 sources, they refer to Foucault more than anyone else. Since I shall be so concerned with names, let me state at once that for all his famous fascination with discourse, naming is only one element in what Foucault calls the “constitution of subjects” (in context a pun, but in one sense the making up of the subject): “We should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really, and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc.” (Foucault 1980, 97).

For those of us influenced by Foucault, the choice of topic and time may be biased. My examples dwell in the nineteenth century and are obsessed with deviation and control. Thus among the questions on a complete agenda, we should include these two: is making up people intimately linked to control? Is making up people itself of recent origin? The answer to both questions might conceivably be yes. We may be observing a particular medico-forensic-political language of individual and social control. Likewise, the sheer proliferation of labels that began in the nineteenth century may have engendered vastly more kinds of people than the world had ever known before.

Partly in order to distance myself for a moment from issues of repression, and partly for intrinsic interest, I would like to abstract from my examples. If there were some truth in the descriptions I and others have furnished, then making up people would bear on one of the great traditional questions of philosophy, namely, the debate between nominalists and realists. John Boswell (1982-3) has already pointed out how this intersects with questions about homosexuality.

A traditional nominalist says that stars (or algae, or justice) have nothing in common with others of their kind except our names for them (“stars,” “algae,” “justice”). The traditional realist in contrast finds it amazing that the world could so kindly sort itself into our categories. He protests that there are definite sorts of objects in it, at least stars and algae, which we have painstakingly come to recognize and classify correctly. The robust realist does not have to argue very hard that people also come about in common with others of their kind except our names for them which we have painstakingly come to recognize and classify correctly. The realist will assert that even though our attitudes to human beings that we notice who is fat and who is dead, but the fact itself that some of our fellows are fat and others are dead has nothing to do with our schemes of classification.

The realist continues: consumption was not only a sickness but also a moral failing, caused by defects of character. That is an important nineteenth-century social fact about TB. We discovered in due course, however, that the disease is transmitted by bacilli that divide very slowly and that we can kill. It is a fact about us that we were first moralistic and later made this discovery, but it is a brute fact about tuberculosis that it is a specific disease transmitted by microbes. The nominalist is left rather weakly admitting that even though a particular kind of person, the consumptive, may have been an artifact of the nineteenth century, the disease itself is an entity in its own right, independently of how we classify.

It would be foolhardy to have an opinion about one of the more stable human dichotomies, male and female. But very roughly, the robust realist will agree that there may be certain physiological borderline cases once called “hermaphrodites.” The existence of vague boundaries is normal: most of us are neither tall nor short, fat nor thin. Sexual physiology is unusually abrupt in its divisions. The realist will take the occasional compulsive fascination with transvestitism, or horror about hermaphrodites as human (nominalist) resistance to nature’s putative aberrations (Greenblatt 1986). Likewise, the realist will assert that even though our attitudes to gender are almost entirely nonobjective and culturally ordained, gender itself is a real distinction.

I do not know if there were thoroughgoing, consistent, hard-line nominalists who held that every classification is of our own making. I might pick that great British nominalist Hobbes out of context. Near the beginning of his Elements of Philosophy (II.4) he said, “How can any man imagine that the names of things were imposed by their natures?”

Equally, one could pick Nelson Goodman as the heir of Hobbes. Trendy nominalists might refer to his Ways of Worldmaking (1978), whose very title is a paean to what he calls his irrealsim, but the hard line was drawn much earlier in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1954)—a line so hard that few philosophers who write about the “new riddle of induction” presented in that book appear even to see (what I think is) the point. Goodman was saying that the only reason to project the hypothesis that all emeralds are green rather than grue—the latter hypothesis using a made-up word that implies that those emeralds which are in the future examined for the first time, will prove to be blue rather than green—is the that word “green” is entrenched. That is, it is a word and a classification that we have been using. Where the inductive skeptic Hume allowed that there is a real quality,
greenness, which we project out of habit, for Goodman there is only our habit of using the word "green." Douglas Stalker's (1994) anthology of papers about Goodman's riddle confirms, I think, that most philosophers who write about the topic do not take it very seriously. I do: see my piece in that anthology (1994), and my discussion of Kripke and Goodman (1993b). Following Goodman, one usually thinks of his riddle arising after Hume has been disposed of. I argue that in a certain sense the difficulty is "pre-Humian" (Hacking 1993c).

The nominalism that one can extract from Hobbes, Goodman, and their vibrant scholastic predecessors such as Ockham and Duns Scotus still pales before a perhaps nonexistent kind of nominalist, who thinks that (a) all categories, classes and taxonomies are created and fixed by human beings rather than found in nature, and that (b) classifications may grow or be revised, but once in place they are basically fixed and do not interact with what is classified. I believe that this sort of static nominalism is doubly wrong: I think that many categories come from nature, not from the human mind, and I think our categories are not static. A different kind of nominalism—I call it dynamic nominalism—-attracts my realist self, spurred on by theories about the making of the homosexual and the heterosexual as kinds of persons or by my observations about official statistics. The claim of dynamic nominalism is not that there was a kind of person who came increasingly to be recognized by bureaucrats or by students of human nature, but rather that a kind of person came into being at the same time as the kind itself was being invented. In some cases, that is, our classifications and our classes conspire to emerge hand in hand, each egging the other on.

Take four categories: horse, planet, glove, and multiple personality. It would be preposterous to suggest that the only thing horses have in common is that we call them horses. We may draw the boundaries to admit or to exclude Shetland ponies, but the similarities and differences are real enough. The planets furnish one of T. S. Kuhn's examples of conceptual change (Kuhn 1962, 115). Arguably, the heavens looked different after we grouped Earth with the other planets and excluded Moon and Sun, but I am sure that acute thinkers had discovered a real difference. I hold (most of the time) that strict nominalism is unintelligible for horses and the planets. How could horses and planets be so obedient to our minds? Gloves are something else: we manufacture them. I know not which came first, the thought or the mitten, but they have evolved hand in hand. That the concept "glove" fits gloves so well is no surprise; we made them that way. My claim about making up people is that in a few interesting respects multiple personalities (and much else) are more like gloves than like horses. The category and the people in it emerged hand in hand.

How might a dynamic nominalism affect the concept of the individual person? One answer has to do with possibility. Who we are is not only what we did, do, and will do, but also what we might have done and may do. Making up people changes the space of possibilities for personhood. Even the dead are more than their deeds, for we make sense of a finished life only within its sphere of former possibilities. But our possibilities, although inexhaustible, are also bounded. If the nominalist thesis about sexuality were correct, it simply wasn't possible to be a heterosexual kind of person before the nineteenth century, for that kind of person was not there to choose. What could that mean? What could it mean in general to say that possible ways to be a person can from time to time come into being or disappear? Such queries force us to be careful about the idea of possibility itself.

We have a naive picture of the gradations of possibility. Some things, for example, are easy to do, some hard, and some plain impossible. What is impossible for one person is possible for another. At the limit we have the statement: "With men it is impossible, but not with God: for with God, all things are possible" (Mark 10:27). (Christ had been saying that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven.) Degrees of possibility are degrees in the ability of some agent to do or make something. The more ability, the more possibility, and omnipotence makes anything possible. At that point, logicians have stumbled, worrying about what were once called "the eternal truths" and are now called "logical necessities." Even God cannot make a five-sided square. Or so mathematicians say, except for a few such eminent dissenters as Descartes. Often this limitation on omnipotence is explained linguistically, being said to reflect our unwillingness to call anything a five-sided square.

There is something more interesting that God can't do. Suppose that Arnold Davidson, in my opening quotation about perversion, is literally correct. Then it was not possible for God to make George Washington a pervert. God could have delayed Washington's birth by over a century, but would that have been the same man? God could have moved the medical discourse back 100-odd years. But God could not have simply made him a
pervert, the way He could have made him freckled or had him captured and hung for treachery. This may seem all the more surprising since Washington was but eight years older than the Marquis de Sade—and Krafft-Ebing has sadomasochism among the four chief categories of perversion. But it follows from Davidson's doctrine that de Sade was not afflicted by the disease of perversion, nor even the disease of sadomasochism either.

Such strange claims are more trivial than they seem; they result from a contrast between people and things. Except when we interfere, what things are doing, and indeed what camels are doing, does not depend on how we describe them. But some of the things that we ourselves do are intimately connected to our descriptions. Many philosophers follow Elizabeth Anscombe and say that intentional human actions must be "actions under a description" (Anscombe 1957). This is not mere lingualism, for descriptions are embedded in our practices and lives. But if a description is not there, then intentional actions under that description cannot be there either: that, apparently, is a fact of logic.

Elaborating on this difference between people and things: what camels, mountains, and microbes are doing does not depend on our words. What happens to tuberculosis bacilli depends on whether or not we poison them with BCG vaccine, but it does not depend upon how we describe them. Of course we poison them with a certain vaccine in part because we describe them in certain ways, but it is the vaccine that kills, not our words. Human action is more closely linked to human description than bacterial action is.

A century ago I would have said that consumption is caused by bad air and sent the patient to the Alps. Today, I may say that TB is caused by microbes and prescribe a two-year course of injections. But what is happening to the microbes and the patient is entirely independent of my correct or incorrect description, even though it is not independent of the medication prescribed. The microbes' possibilities are delimited by nature, not by words. What is curious about human action is that by and large what I am deliberately doing depends on the possibilities of description. To repeat, this is a tautological inference from what is now a philosopher's commonplace, that all intentional acts are acts under a description. Hence if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequence.

Let us now add an example to our repertoire; let it have nothing to do with deviancy, let it be rich in connotations of human practices, and let it help furnish the end of a spectrum of making up people opposite from the multiple personality. I take it from Jean-Paul Sartre, partly for the well-deserved fame of his description, partly for its excellence as description, partly because Sartre is our premium philosopher who writes about choice, and partly because recalling Sartre will recall an example that returns me to my origin. Let us first look at Sartre's magnificent humdrum example. Many among us might have chosen to be a waiter or waitress and several have been one for a time. A few men might have chosen to be something more specific, a Parisian garçon de café, about whom Sartre writes in his immortal discussion of bad faith: "His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly, his eyes express an interest too solicitous for the order of the customer" (Sartre 1956, 59). Psychiatrists and medical people in general try to be extremely specific in describing, but no description of the several classical kinds of split personality is as precise (or as recognizable) as this. Imagine for a moment that we are reading not the words of a philosopher who writes his books in cafés but those of a doctor who writes them in a clinic. Has the garçon de café a chance of escaping treatment by experts? Was Sartre knowing or merely anticipating when he concluded this very paragraph with the words: "There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition." That is a good reminder of Sartre's teaching: possibility, project, and prison are one of a piece.

Sartre's antihero chose to be a waiter. Evidently that was not a possible choice in other places, other times. There are servile people in most societies, and servants in many, but a waiter is something specific, and a garçon de café more specific. Sartre remarks that the waiter is doing something different when he pretends to play at being a sailor or a diplomat than when he plays at being a waiter in order to be a waiter. I think that in most parts of, let us say, Alberta (or in a McDonald's anywhere), a waiter playing at being a garçon de café would miss the mark as surely as if he were playing at being a diplomat passing over the French frites. As with almost every way in which it is possible to be a person, it is possible to be a garçon de café only at a certain time, in a certain place, in a certain social setting. The feudal serf putting food on my lady's table can no more choose to be a garçon de café than he can choose to be lord of the manor. But the impossibility is evidently different in kind.
It is not a technical impossibility. Serfs may once have dreamed of travel to the moon; certainly their lettered betters wrote or read adventures of moon travel. But moon travel was impossible for them, whereas it is not quite impossible for today’s young waiter. One young waiter will, in a few years, be serving steaks in a satellite. Sartre is at pains to say that even technical limitations do not mean that you have fewer possibilities. For every person, in every era, the world is a plenty of possibilities. “Of course,” Sartre writes, “a contemporary of Duns Scotus is ignorant of the use of the automobile or the aeroplane . . . For the one who has no relation of any kind to these objects and the techniques that refer to them, there is a kind of absolute, unthinkable, and undecipherable nothingness. Such a nothing can in no way limit the For-itself that is choosing itself; it cannot be apprehended as a lack, no matter how we consider it” (Sartre 1956, 522). Passing to a different example, he continues, “The feudal world offered to the vassal lord of Raymond VI infinite possibilities of choice; we do not possess more.”

“Absolute, unthinkable, and undecipherable nothingness” is a great phrase. That is exactly what being a multiple personality, or being a garçon de café, was to Raymond’s vassal. Many of you could, in truth, be neither a Parisian waiter nor a split personality, but both are thinkable, decipherable somethingnesses. It would be possible for God to have made you one or the other or both, leaving the rest of the world more or less intact. That means, to me, that the outer reaches of your space as an individual are essentially different from what they would have been had these possibilities not come into being.

Thus the idea of making up people is enriched; it applies not to the unfortunate elect but to all of us. It is not just the making up of people of a kind that did not exist before: not only are the split person and the waiter made up, but each of us is made up. We are not only what we are but what we might have been, and the possibilities for what we might have been are transformed.

Hence anyone who thinks about the individual, the person, must reflect on this strange idea of making up people. Do my stories tell a uniform tale? Manifestly not. The multiple personality, the homosexual or heterosexual person, and the waiter form one spectrum among many that may color our perception here.

Suppose there is some truth in the labeling theory of the modern homosexual. It cannot be the whole truth, and this for several reasons, including one that is future-directed and one that is past-directed. The future-directed fact is that after the institutionalization of the homosexual person in law and official morality, the people involved had a life of their own, individually and collectively. As gay liberation has amply proved, that life was no simple product of the labeling.

The past-directed fact is that the labeling did not occur in a social vacuum, in which those identified as homosexual people passively accepted the format. There was a complex social life that is only now revealing itself in the annals of academic social history. It is quite clear that the internal life of innumerable clubs and associations interacted with the medico-forensic-journalistic labeling. Whatever the medico-forensic experts tried to do with their categories, the homosexual person became autonomous of the labeling.

The garçon de café is at the opposite extreme. There is of course a social history of waiters in Paris. Some of this will be as anecdotal as the fact that croissants originated in the cafes of Vienna after the Turkish siege was lifted in 1683: the pastries in the shape of a crescent were a mockery of Islam. Other parts of the story will be structurally connected with numerous French institutions. But the class of waiters is autonomous of any act of labeling. At most, the name garçon de café can continue to ensure both the inferior position of the waiter and the fact that he is male. Sartre’s precise description does not fit the fille de salle; that is a different role.

I do not believe there is a general story to be told about making up people. Each category has its own history. If we wish to present a partial framework in which to describe such events, we might think of two vectors. One is the vector of labeling from above, from a community of experts who create a “reality” that some people make their own. Different from this is the vector of the autonomous behavior of the person so labeled, which presses from below, creating a reality every expert must face. The second vector is negligible for the split but powerful for the homosexual person. People who write about the history of homosexuality seem to disagree about the relative importance of the two vectors. My scheme at best highlights what the dispute is about. It provides no answers.

The scheme is also too narrow. I began by mentioning my own studies in official statistics and asserted that these also, in a less melodramatic way, contribute to making up people. There is a story to tell here, even about Parisian waiters, who surface in the official statistics of Paris surprisingly late, in 1881. However, I shall conclude with yet another way of making up
people and human acts, one of notorious interest to the existentialist culture of a couple of generations past. I mean suicide, the option that Sartre always left open to the For-itself. Suicide sounds like a timeless option. It is not. Indeed it might be better described as a French obsession.

There have been cultures, including some in recent European history, that knew no suicide. It is said that there were no suicides in Venice when it was the noblest city of Europe. But can I seriously propose that suicide is a concept that has been made up? Oddly, that is exactly what is said by the deeply influential Esquirol in his 1823 medical-encyclopedia article on suicide (Esquirol 1823, 53, 213). He mistakenly asserts that the very word was devised by his predecessor Sauvages. What is true is this: suicide was made the property of medics only at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and a major fight it was (Hacking 1982b). It was generally allowed that there was the noble suicide, the suicide of honor or of state, but all the rest had to be regarded as part of the new medicine of insanity. By mid-century it would be contended that there was no case of suicide that was not preceded by symptoms of insanity (Bourdin 1845, 19).

This literature concerns the doctors and their patients. It exactly parallels a statistical story. Foucault suggests we think in terms of “two poles of development linked together by a whole cluster of intermediary relations” (Foucault 1978, 139). One pole centers on the individual as a speaking, working, procreating entity he calls the “anatomo-politics of the human body.” The second pole, “focused on the species body,” serves as the “basis of the biological processes: propagation, births, and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity.” He calls this polarity “biopolitics of the population.” Suicide aptly illustrates patterns of connection between both poles. The medical men comment on the bodies and their past, which led to self-destruction; the statisticians count and classify the bodies. Every fact about the suicide becomes fascinating. The statisticians compose forms to be completed by doctors and police, recording everything from the time of death to the objects found in the pockets of the corpse. The various ways of killing oneself are abruptly characterized and become symbols of national character. The French favor carbon monoxide and drowning; the English hang or shoot themselves.

By the end of the nineteenth century there was so much information about French suicides that Durkheim could use suicide to measure social pathology. Earlier, a rapid increase in the rate of suicide in all European countries had caused great concern. Some authors have suggested that the growth may have been largely apparent, a consequence of improved systems of reporting (Douglas 1967, chap. 3). It was thought that there were more suicides because more care was taken to report them. But such a remark is unwittingly ambiguous: reporting brought about more suicides. I do not refer to suicide epidemics that follow a sensational case, like that of Heinrich von Kleist, who shot his lover and then himself on the Wannsee in 1811—an event vigorously reported in every European capital. I mean instead that the systems of reporting positively created an entire ethos of suicide, right down to the suicide note, an art form that previously was virtually unknown apart from the rare noble suicide of state. Suicide has of course attracted attention in all times and has invited such distinguished essayists as Cicero and Hume. But the distinctively European and American pattern of suicide is a historical artifact. Even the unmaking of people has been made up.

Naturally, my kinds of making up people are far from exhaustive. Individuals serve as role models and sometimes thereby create new roles. We have only to think of James Clifford’s study of the two most famous Anglo-Poles, Joseph Conrad and Bronislaw Malinowski (Clifford 1986). Malinowski’s work largely created the participant-observer cultural-relativist ethnographer, even if Malinowski himself did not truly conform to that role in the field. He did something more important—he made up a kind of scholar. The advertising industry relies on our susceptibilities to role models and is largely engaged in trying to make up people. But here nominalism, even of a dynamic kind, is not the key. Often we have no name for the very role a model entices us to adopt.

Dynamic nominalism remains an intriguing doctrine, arguing that numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of the ways to name them. It is for me the only intelligible species of nominalism, the only one that can even gesture at an account of how common names and the named could so tidily fit together. It is of more human interest than the arid and scholastic forms of nominalism, because it contends that our spheres of possibility, and hence ourselves, are to some extent made up by our naming and what that entails. But let us not be overly optimistic about the future of dynamic nominalism. It has the merit of bypassing abstract hand-waving and inviting us to do serious philosophy, namely, to take a look: to examine the intricate origin of our ideas of multiple personality or of suicide. It is, we might say, putting some flesh on that wizened figure, John Locke, who wrote about
the origin of ideas while introspecting at his desk. But just because dy-
namic nominalism invites us to examine the intricacies of real life, it has
little chance of being a general philosophical theory. Although we may find
it useful to arrange influences according to Foucault’s poles and my vec-
tors, such metaphors are mere suggestions of what to look for next. I see
no reason to suppose that we shall ever tell two identical stories of two dif-
ferent instances of making up people.

In an exhilarating interview, Michel Foucault described some of his work
in progress. He agreed to the interview title “On the Genealogy of Ethics.”
Indeed, many of his new ideas were captured in an only slightly unusual
sense of the word “ethics.” Perhaps Foucault had written enough about
what we say and do to other people. He had now become preoccupied with
what we say and do to ourselves. Official or prevalent or private moral
codes would be part of that story, but there is

another side to the moral prescriptions, which most of the time is not
isolated as such but is, I think, very important: the kind of relationship
you ought to have with yourself, rapport à soi, which I call ethics, and
which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as
a moral subject of his own action. (pp. 237–8).

Where previous nominalists thought of the self as making up its own
categories, Foucault did not imagine that there is any self, any ego, any I,
writing to do that. Each human subject—you, me—is an artifact. Because
of Foucault’s almost doctrinaire loathing of most forms of repression, and